Algorithmic Intentionality: Toward a Phenomenology of Generative AI and Its Possible Worlds
Keywords:
artificial intelligence, intentionality, lifeworld, alterity, generative AI, reduction, technical object, large language models, quasi-intentionality, phantom bodyAbstract
This paper investigates whether and how generative artificial intelligence systems – specifically large language models (LLMs) and conversational AI – can be examined through classical phenomenological concepts: intentionality, reduction, lifeworld (Lebenswelt), embodiment, and alterity. Rejecting both naive anthropomorphism (treating AI as conscious) and reductive functionalism (treating AI as mere statistics), I propose a phenomenology of AI as quasi-alterity – a technical entity that displays intentional-like performances without subjective consciousness. Drawing on Husserl's theory of intentionality, Heidegger's equipmental analysis, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment and language, and recent work on technical objects (Stiegler, Ihde, Waldenfels), I argue that AI systems require a revised epoché that brackets both humanistic and computational biases. The paper proceeds in nine sections: (1) a phenomenological framing of the AI question, (2) a Husserlian analysis of quasi-intentionality with detailed distinctions, (3) the lifeworld and second-order world generation, (4) a Heideggerian reading of AI as equipment with extended discussion of breakdown, (5) the paradox of disembodied language after Merleau-Ponty, (6) AI as a new form of technical alterity in dialogue with Lévinas and Waldenfels, (7) a complete methodological protocol for doing phenomenology with and on AI, (8) an extended engagement with contemporary phenomenological literature, and (9) a conclusion outlining future research. The paper aims to provide a systematic phenomenological framework for understanding human-AI encounters without premature ontological commitments.
